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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

...
'

!.··

JAEGER AND BRANCH, INC. a
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

Case No.
10885

JIM PAPPAS dba JIM PAPPAS
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendant- Appellant··
Appeal from a Judgment against the Defendant
Granted by the Third District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, Honorable Leonard W. Elton,
Judge, Presiding.

.I

I

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

.,'"

Respondent, taking the position of a
holder in due course of a check in the face

amount of $6,500.00 has brought suit against the!
I

maker of the check, the maker asserting the claiu
that because of certain conversations between
the maker and the holder, prior to writing of
the check, placed the duty upon the holder to
investigate the circumstances giving rise ·to

the check before accepting the same.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The parties having stipulated in chambers
that the respondent, by introducing the check sued
upon into evidence, had presented a prima facie
case, that respondent was the holder in due course,
and the appellant then having presented his

evidenc~

and the respondent then having moved the Court for
judgment in its favor on the grounds that the Appellant did not present a defense, the Court granted
judgment in respondent's favor for the sum of
$6,500.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 6%
per annum from January 18, 1966, plus costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of
the District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not agree with appellant's
statement of facts.

It is to be noted at this point

that respondent had introduced no testimony other
than the 2 pages of testimony of W. W. KIMBALL,
TR 21, 22 and 23.

The testimony upon which the

lower Court made is decision was that of appellant's
and not respondent's.

However, that testimony, far

from being undisputed, was,., weighed and accepted and

rejected by the trial Court by the standards of
its consistency and ultimately, its credibility.
Respondent disagrees with the following
statements of fact made by appellant:
1.

On page 3 of appellant's brief, there i1

no indication that the two deliveries referred to
therein were to be the last deliveries (TR 51,
L 13-14).

2.

Again on page 3 of appellant's brief,

the check was not forwarded as a payment for the
goops to be received,but for working capital (TR74,
lines 2 through 6).
3.

Again on page 3, respondent disagrees

with appellant's statement.

The evidence shows ap-

pellant had told ALLO that payment on the check
would be stopped only after the check had been
delivered to ALLO by appellant, and only after, it
had been in turn negotiated by ALLO to respondent.
It is to be noted that on TR 51, lines 6 and 7,
appellant testified that "I have sent you a company
check"; yet, at the time of that conversation, the
check had not been written.

Appellant clarifies

this language later on, on TR 51, lines 18 through

20, when he states that it was Monday morning, Jan-·
~uary 11, 1966

when he said, "ff that truck is not

here Tuesday morning, I am going to stop payment
on the check".
4.

The telephone calls

alluded to on page

3 of appellant's brief did not take place on Januar:;: I
12, but took place on January 11, 1966 (TR 55), be-•
fore the check was written.
5.

On page 4 of appellant's brief, there

was no testimony whatsoever that ALLO DISTRIBUTING

1
'

"agreed to ship an additional truckload of merchan- i'
dise".

The only testimony on TR 43, lines 24 to

,.

:·

27, was that "there was the 13 rolls of carpeting
ii·

yet to be received .... ".
6.

Again, on page 5 of Appellant's brief,

respondent clearly told appellant that respondent
was owed money by ALLO (TR 80, lines 25 ,26 and 27).
7.

1'

il

On page 9 of appellant's brief, appell- ~l

:;Ir

ant states that the "final shipment was not receivec{i
There is no evidence as to what the final shipment
was; therefore, obviously no

evidenc~~s
I

to whether

or not it was received.(TR 51, lines 13 and 14)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as neither appellant nor respondent
has designated the exhibits on this appeal, neither
lfthe parties may rely upon them, but must confine
their arguments to the transcript and the record on

I

[

appeal before this Honorable Court.
This statement of facts which will follow,
will be presented in chronological order.
Prior to January 12, 1966, ALLO DISTRIBUTING, who is not a party to this litigation, had,
pursuant to some agreements which are not before
this Court, been selling merchandise to the appellant (TR 29, lines 5 through 7).

There is no evidenc 1

before this Court as to what the nature of the relationship was between ALLO and appellant, other
than supplier and purchaser, nor what the terms of
the purported agreerrents between ALLO and appellant
were.
There was never any agreements between respondent and appellant (TR 59, line 27).
On January 11, 1966, and before the subject.
check was written, the appellant and his "interior
decorator", who held no official position with
defendant (TR 25, lines 27 and 28; TR 62, lines 28
through 30; TR 63, lines 1 through 11; TR 35, lines
24 through 30; TR 36, lines 1 through 4), and whose

duties and authority as an interior decorator were
unclear and uncertain, had four conversations with
respondent's agent, DON MORELAND. It is to be
noted that all of these co~ersations with appellant

) took place before the. check was written on January 12
1

12, 1966 (TR 49; TR 53, line 11; TR 55, lines 5
through 8; TR 61, line 30; TR 63, line 30; TR 64,
lines 1 through 2; TR 77, lines 4 and 5; TR 82,
lines 25 through 29).
The purpose of the conversations with respondent was to determine (1) if JAEGER & BRANCH had
been paid, and (2) if respondent was holding up the
shipment of carpeting (TR 49, lines 3 through 11).
It is uncertain whether or not appellant succeeded

in having his inquiries answered.

On page TR 49,

lines 26 through 30, appellant testified that MORE-

LAND couldn't tell him what the status of the relat- Ii

ionship or the accounts were between respondent and
ALLO, that possibly, on TR 50, line 5, MORELAND was

either "real happy with the deal" or "had been paid ·
in full" or that the interior decorator had been tol
by MORELAND prior to January 12, 1966, that.money
was still owed (TR 80, lines 25 through 27).
It is critical to note what was not said
during these four conversations between appellant
and respondent; namely, there was no mention of the
check, and obviously then neither was there any mentio~

of the maker, the payee, the amount, the drawer
-6-

or the date of the check, nor was there any mention :
of any conditions of delivery of said check, nor the
consideration for the check.

At the time of these

conversations, the check had not yet been written.
The check was written on January 12, 1966 (Pre-Trial
Order TR 6).
On January 12, 1966, after the conversations·
with respondent, appellant executed the subject

I'

check (Pre-Trial Order TR 6).
There is nothing in the record to indicate

,.

"

that the check was not regular or unconditional on
,1.

its face (TR 69).
There is nothing in the record to indicate
that the check was delivered to the payee, ALLO,
with a cover letter or written memoranda implying
conditions upon the delivery (TR 69, lines 13 and
14).

As a matter of fact, Appellant did not tell thE'

payee either in writing or by word of mouth what
to do with the check (TR 75, lines 27 through 30).

Question: "Did you tell them what he should or
should not do with the check?" Answer: "No.

I im-

agine he (ALLO) was going to cash it." Question:
y ou d•d
I
l. n t tell him not to cash it?" Answer: "I
should say not." Question: ''You didn't tell him not
II

-7-

to negotiate it?"

Answer:

"No."

It is obvious that the trial Court chose to
disbelieve appellant's claim made in paragraph 3
of its Answer (TR 3) which reads: " And the deliver):
of the check was conditioned upon shipment of addit-:
ional items of equipment and furniture forthwith by'
ALLO DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, which ALLO failed to do.,.

The trial Court in choosing to disbelieve appellant•·
claim relied in part on the foregoing and the

follo~·

ing testimony: Question: "And you told them that thl
reason you were sending the check for $6,000.00
is for them to get the carpet released?"

Answer:

"The reason I told them that I was going to send
them the $6,000.00 is that they had to pay all of
their bills, everything had been paid for, and that,

I

they needed some operating capital and it would hel1:

I

very much if they had $6,000.00." (TR 75, lines 29- '
50, TR 76, lines 1-6).
The strongest language upon which appellant
can rely is the appellant's testimony of purported

1

conversation with ALLO in which appellant attempts
to establish a conditional delivery. "I told them
I would send him the check on those conditions".
What appellant never testified is what those condi-

1
i

tions were.

Instead appellant testified on (TR 75,

lines 27-30) that appellant didn't tell the payee,
ALLO, not to cash the check, or what to do with the

check, but presumed that ALLO would cash the check. ·I
Pursuant to stipulation (TR 21, lines 6-9)
made in Chambers at the time of trial (TR 12), and
the Pre-Trial Order (TR 6), it was stipulated that
the check was delivered to respondent by ALLO on
January 14, 1966, and that respondent's, prima facie'
took the check as a holder in due course.
The carpeting was released on the very same
day that the check was negotiated to respondent,

,1.

on January 14, 1966 (TR 60, lines 10-14 and lines
20 and 21).

There is no testimony of any communications, :
either by word of mouth or written communications,
between appellant and respondent during the period
of time after the check was written on January 12,
1966.
Payment was stopped on the check January 18,
1966 (TR 22, line 9).

ARGUMENT
Point 1:

The evidence is to be construed it

favor of respondent.
Appellant's assertion that the evidence is ,

lj'
'I

to be construed in favor of the appellant on the
force of an analogy of the case at bar with that of
a Summary Judgment, is to fly in the face of logic •.
In a Summary Judgment context, the trial Court neve1 I
I

had an opportunity to hear the testimony or to weigl

1

the credibility of the witnesses, and for that reason every indulgence in the favor of the non-prevailing parties is made.

In the case at bar,however,

the trial Court did have an opportunity to hear
appellant's witness and to examine appellant's
ence.

·'1
evid~I

The trial Judge, who was the trier of fact,

did have the opportunity to weigh the credibility

,I

·11l

of the appellant's claims, to hear the witness'
voice, and to examine the witness' demeanor.

It is

respectfully submitted that this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial Court
with respect to the weighing of the evidence.

As

stated in MC COLLUM vs. CLOTHIER 121 U.311, 241
P 2d 468, the plaintiff having prevailed, is entitled to the benefit of the evidence viewed in the
light most favorable to him, together with every
inference and intendment fairly and reasonably arising there form.
Point 2£

1

Appellant having stipulated in the

trt.d.1 Court that plaintiff was
-1 ('\_

a holder in due coursi

and had made out its case prima facie, cannot invoke the provisions of 70A-3-307 UCA, 1953.
Counsel stipulated in Chambers, as is supper·
ted by the record (12; TR 21, lines 1 - 9; TR 24,
lines 27 and 28) that it was to be presumed that
plaintiff was a holder in due course and had made
its prima facie case by introducing the check into
etvidence.

It was agreed at the Court's suggestion

and by counsel that to conserve the Court's time,
appellant would proceed to rebutf respondent's prima:
facie case as a holder in due course.

Appellant now attempts to invoke the benefit ·

1

of 70A-3-307 UCA, 1953, and to place the burden of
proof on respondent, in violation of the stipulation
made before the trial court.

'!be only explanation

that respondent can find for this argument made by
appellant, is that the author of the brief, Mr. M.
BYRON FISHER was not the trial counsel and was not
present in Court.
An examination of the transcript reveals
that the trial counsel for appellant, MR. BIRD, understood the stipulation, and conducted himself pursuant to that stipulation.

'!be Court's attention is

respectfully directed to (TR 32, R.30 and TR 33, L.
1-8) which indicates that during our colloquy , the

question was raised as to the relevancy of acts occurring after the negotiation and endorsement of the checl<
)

by the payee to respondent.

Appellant and respondent

and the Court were proceeding, pursuant to the beforesaid Stipulation, in essence, that unless appellant
succeeded in rebutting the presumption that respondent
ws a holder in due course, any evidence of acts occurring after the delivery of the check were irrelevant, as the defense that those later acts would estab-

1

lish would be cut off by the negotiation of the check ·

to the holder in due course.

That is why (on TR 32 anc

TR 33) when respondent's counsel objected to a ques-

l

tion which sought information after the check was nego- 1 :

tiated:

"The check was negotiated on January 14; any-

thing happening after January 14 would be irrelevant
for the purposes of this trial."
lant answered:

Counsel for appel-

"I grant that to be true."

Counsel

was merely, by their Stipulation, following the law
enunciated in the case of Mann vso Andrus, 169 Cal Ap
2d 455, 337 P. 2d 473, 476, in which the Court stated:

"The acquisition by the plaintiff of the information
concerning the infirmities, if any, in the. instrument
after the time of purchase, does not affect his status
as a holder in due course."
Appellant had the burden of proof to rebut

-12-

tne prima facie showing that respondent was a holder
1

in due course.

The trial court held that appellant

did not sustain this burden of proof.
Appellant introduced no evidence to the
effect that respondent did not give value for the
check.
Appellant introduced no evidence that the
check was irregular on its face.
Appellant introduced no evidence that respondent had any notice of any infirmity in the check.
Appellant's only contention, both at the
trial and on this appeal, is that respondent had a
duty to investigate and to inquire, and that respondent failed to comply with that duty.

RESPONDENT WAS UNDER NO DUTY OR OBLIGATION
TO INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING
RISE TO THE EXECUTION OF THE CHECK
Appellant has attempted to set forth the
proposition that because of the four telephone calls
between appellant and respondent prior to the execution of the check, respondent was placed under an
obligation to investigate the circumstances giving
rise to the execution of the check.

Appellant's

position is without merit.
An analysis of the four telephone conversations reveals the following:

1

1.

The phone calls were initiated by appel-

2.

Respondent was reluctant to divulge its

lant.
business relationship with its customer, ALLO, for
fear of breaching its business ethics.
3.

That after appellant's tenacious inter-

rogation, respondent finally told appellant that
respondent was owed money by its customer ALLO.
4.

Appellant admitted to respondent that

appellant was not having difficulty with ALLO, but
that appellant "just wanted to be sure that they

[ALLO J weren't maintaining their end of the contract'':
(TR 79, lines 11 - 17).
5.

Neither appellant nor his employee, Miss

, Voorhees, ever mentioned the check to respondent,

I

since it had not been written. (TR 82, lines 25 - 30:
6.

I

The testimony of appellant, although con·

flicting, gives rise to the inference that at the
time of the telephone conversations with respondent,
on January 11, 1966, before the check was written,
appellant had not consummated whatever agreement he
had made with ALLO concerning the check.

Appellant

testified (TR 63, line 30; TR 64, lines 1 and 2):
11

At the time when Miss Voorhees called Donald
-14-

Moreland, there was no checks wrote.
amount settled on."

There was no

And again on (TR 59, lines 7 -

9): "Did you tell Don Moreland the amount of the

checks you were about to pay ALLO DISTRIBUTING COMPANY?

Answer:

No, sir.

There was no amounts set

at that tirne. 11
It is respectfully submitted that the trial
Judge correctly concluded that at the time of the
conversations between appellant and respondent, appellant had not yet made his "deal" with the payee
ALLO.
tha~

At the very least, the inference is present
if appellant had made its deal with the payee

ALLO, it did not communicate this fact to respondent
After those phone conversations, when respondent received the check, on January 14, 1966, and
observed that the check was regular on its face, and
observed that the check was written the day after
the phone calls, January 12, 1966, there is no reaso
in the world why respondent, acting as a reasonable

man, should question the propriety of the check in
the payee ALLO'S handso

The reasonable inference,

it is submitted, is that after the phone calls on

January 11, between appellant and respondent, appellant decided to pay ALLO •

. ....

The entire r.stionale underlying the concept
of negotiability would be frustrated, and commerce
would be halted, if a prospective holder of a negotiable instrument was forced to make an investigation each time the instrument was negotiated to him

0

Szczotka vs. Idelson, 39 Cal Reporter 466 (California) on page 471, holds:

"The decisions hold that

a purchaser of negotiable paper before maturity
need not make inquiry of the makers with respect to
the consideration therefor and the circumstances
leading up to the execution.(Witty vs. Clinch, 207
Ca 1 7 9 8 , 2 7 9 P • 79 9) "
The cases cited in support of appellant's
proposition that respondent had a duty in inquire,
are not in pointo

The facts of the case of Norman

vs. Worldwide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pao, super
193 Au 3d 115 (1963) is distinguishable on its facts

In that case, the purported holder in due course had
dealt with the defrauding payees in three different
situations in which the payees had used different
names; the holder in due course knew that the refer-I
ral plan of the payees was closely suspect of being
fraudulent; the holder in due course even called the
maker of the note to disavow any knowledge of the

i

purported holder in due course of the fraudulent
scheme; the note was purchased by the purported holder in due course for a substantial discount, a matter of days after the execution of the note.

In the 1

case at bar, the record is totally devoid of any
complicity on the part of the respondent with the
payee.

Appellant even testified that respondent

was concerned about the ethics in speaking with appellant (TR 42, line 16).
In the case cited by appellant of Potter
Bank and Trust Coo

VSo

Massey, 11 Misc, 2d 523, 171

N.Y.S. 2d 27 (1958), the court was faced with a
statute which is substantially different from 70A-3302 (1) (b) U.C.Ao, in 1953, which deals with

requisites of a holder in due course.

the

The Utah stat-

ute provides only that the holder must be one "in
good faith", yet the statute before the court in the
Potter case provided that the holder must be "in
good faith including observance of the reasonable
.£.Q_mmercial standards of any business in which the
h2_lder may be engaged."

When the State of Utah en-

acted the Uniform Commercial Code, it did not include
the language which is underlined.

on 11 Misc. 2d 526, states:

The Potter court,

"Plaintiff argues that

the words italicized above [the underlined language]
affected no change in Pennsylvania law, and that,
under prior decisions, nothing short of .actual knowledge or a wilful intent to evade such knowledge will
constitute lack of good faith.

Whether that was

the law prior to 1953 is not necessary to decide;
the clear language of the statute ••• ''.

Respondent

herein submits that because of the difference in
the language between the statute cited in the Potter
case and the statute enacted in the State of Utah,
a different result must followo

Neither respondent,

nor, evidently, appellant has been able to find any
applicable Utah cases on this point.

It is there-

fore respectfully submitted that the Utah statute
when read with the holding of Szczocka vs. Idelson,
supra, there was no duty. on the part of respondent
to make an investigation.

Even if this Court should

find that the law of Utah does impose a duty of investigation, it is respectfully submitted that the
facts, as reflected by the transcript, in the case
at bar, are not sufficient so as to place that duty
upon this respondent.

If nothing else, respondent

had every right to be reassured, upon receiving a
check dated after respondent's conversations with
-18-

appellan.:.
CONCLUSION
The trial of this suit, before the trial
Judge, was conducted and tried pursuant to a Stipulation by which defendant had the burden of proof
of rebutting the presumption that plaintiff was a
holder in due course and entitled to judgment.
After hearing

defendant'~appellant 1 s)

evidence,

after weighing the credibility of the evidence,
after

examini~g

and rejecting the testimony and the

possible inferences and presumptions arising therefrom, the trial court concluded that defendant did
not establish a defense and did not rebut plaintiff'
presumptive prima facie case.
In answer to appellant's claim that respondent was placed under a duty of inquiry, there is
ample evidence to support Finding of Fact 1fa2, "that
plaintiff had no notice of any conditions or circumstances on or prior to the date that the check
was negotiated to plaintiff, which would put plainc:if f on notice of any infirmities of the check, or
would likewise impose a duty of inquiry upon plaint•cc

l

.L J...

11

(TR 13)

It is respectfully submitted that the

language of the McCollum vs. Clothier case, supra,
compels this Court to accept the Findings of Fact
of the trial court, and to affirm the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

-20-

